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Our troublesome fin de siècle seems to be a period marked by many “ends.” 
Francis Fukuyama promotes “the end of history,” Jean Baudrillard advances the 
thesis of “the end of the social,” Daniel Bell talks about “the end of ideology,” 
Michel Foucault analyses “the end of the subject,” while many left-wing writers 
pontificate on “the end of the nation” (Kumar -). If anything, however, 
the end of the th century is experiencing, I suggest, the end of the idea of the 
nation-state, which is gradually falling prey to the global circuit of anonymous 
transnational capital. While the nation-state, the modern form of which grew 
out of the th century European emancipatory movements, had been in a po-
sition to more or less successfully control economic tendencies throughout its 
territory up until the Second World War, such control is today next to impos-
sible. In the light of the efforts of mega-corporations to establish a global mar-
ket beyond any specific borders – linguistic, political, ethnic or religious – with 
their tacit spelling out of the rules for the operations of individual national gov-
ernments, the “national” source of capital is not only unidentifiable but also ut-
terly irrelevant. It seems that culture in particular represents the last remaining 
sphere that may be able to preserve some of the features of a specific national 
experience. I will draw on the case of Slovenia to demonstrate, pars pro toto, 
how it is possible to reconcile a particular national tradition with the universal 
mechanisms of globalization. In this regard, Slovenian examples should be seen 
as an illustration of larger processes that may be applicable, with a certain de-
gree of heuristic caution, to the situation of other numerically small Eastern 
and Central European nations.
A nation with a fully developed cultural identity obviously has no problem 
in facing outside challenges and influences. Indeed, facing up to different men-
talities and forms of behavior is the only attitude Slovenians should adopt in or-
der to avoid succumbing to the alluring sirens of self-sufficiency, provincial xe-
nophobia, various forms of exclusivism and the national withering that results. 
ͳe “other” becomes incomprehensible, robbed of his/her humanity and con-
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sequently an enemy only when members of a given national polity are unsure of 
their own negotiated identity. In the case of Slovenia, for example, there should 
be little doubt about the existence of a specific national cultural identity. ͳe 
accomplishments of leading writers, artists, and other creative minds provide 
the Slovenian nation with a strong sense of cultural identity regardless of the 
fact that they are but a handful of the total Slovenian population. However, let 
me be adamant about the following: these creative impulses, such as they were 
historically and are today, should emphatically not be understood as exclusively 
Slovenian in an (admittedly often used) ethnic sense of the word. ͳere exists a 
vibrant, albeit small, current of creative and intellectual voices that have partici-
pated, and continue to actively exercise their participation, in Slovenian public 
life, yet are not necessarily embedded in an ethnic Slovenian tradition.
A few examples should suffice. Emyl Korytko, a Polish émigré in th century 
Ljubljana, gathered Slovenian folk songs and ethnographic material long before 
this task was taken up by ethnic Slovenian scholars themselves. Lily Novy, a 
prominent early th century poetess, was one of the pillars of Slovenian literary 
modernism even though her ethnic background and mother tongue were Ger-
man. Maria Nablocka, a famous theater actress between the two world wars, 
was of “white Russian” extraction. Branko Gavella, an ethnically Croatian the-
ater director, was instrumental in expanding the expressive forms of modern 
Slovenian performing arts, while Czech film director František Čap with his 
hugely popular post-World War II films almost single-handedly established a 
coherent foundation for the modern Slovenian film industry. When it comes to 
contemporaries, Josip Osti, a prolific and much-celebrated writer, who is Bos-
nian in his cultural and ethnic background, Jette Ostan, a Danish theater ac-
tress, and Svava Bernhardsdottir, an Islandic violinist for the Slovenian Philhar-
monic are futher cases in point. While these random examples serve more to 
illustrate the argument than to empirically validate my theoretical insistence on 
a separation of ethnic and civic identity in the public life of a Slovenian nation-
state, they nevertheless emphasize that, against all historical odds and against 
very real dangers of post-independence Slovenian chauvinism, one is invited to 
see the admittedly small in numbers yet artistically and, no less relevant, po-
litically productive participation of individuals who chose their civic identity 
without giving up their attachment to the ethnic communities from which they 
emerged. ͳe latter aspect, that is, one’s civic identity and concomitant “consti-
tutional patriotism” (Habermas) is certainly far from being fully established as 
the norm in contemporary Slovenian public life. Yet I refer to these individuals 
to better outline the possibilities for multiple identities that a modern, secular, 
universalist polity is made of and the chief guarantor of which is a democratic 
nation-state. ͳis aspect needs to be stressed because in an era of both volun-
tary and forced migrations (particularly in the wake of the Yugoslav wars since 
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), the issue of civic identity will ever more urgently haunt the willfully my-
opic Slovenian political elite and those that manipulate symbols and ideas in 
public discourse. It is thus of paramount importance that the separation of eth-
nic and civic identities is kept in mind as one contemplates the current convul-
sions of nation-states, all the more so in light of the fact that the multiplicity of 
identities was, up until the mid-s, allowed to enjoy a considerable degree of 
public currency in a former federal state of Yugoslavia. In the latter, it was not 
only possible but broadly accepted that an individual could have at least a dual 
identity, both as a e.g. ethnic Croat, Serb or Macedonian and as a member of a 
larger political polity that was Yugoslavia. ͳis lesson seems almost entirely lost 
on people who have opted for the definition of their nation-states in terms of 
exclusively ethnic, rather than inclusively civic identity. For Slovenian citizens 
in particular, this lesson should be recuperated and reformulated in a post-in-
dependence Slovenian nation-state insofar as the recent history of Slovenian 
struggles to maintain ethnic identity against a perceived threat of having been 
swallowed up in a larger ethnic frame clearly demonstrates the continuing rel-
evance of sensitivity to the rights of ethnic minorities and multicultural com-
petence. If anything, the refusal to grant weight to “the discourse of numbers,” 
i.e. the size of ethnic communities as a criterion for participation in a politically 
defined civic nation-state, should be a necessary building block in the develop-
ment of Slovenian civic identity since it was the very argument of small numeri-
cal size that was so often in the past used to deny the Slovenian right to exist as 
a separate people.
I hasten to add that a small number of people, two million, does not neces-
sarily make a nation small. Moreover, it would not be impossible to argue that 
the “smallness” of a nation may be measured first and foremost in regard to how 
much the citizens believe in their nation’s creative potential and the richness of 
their cultural tradition. 
ͳe argument of small numerical size as evidence in support of the claim 
about the inevitable, if gradual absorption of the Slovenian nation in the “larger 
context” is often used today in Ljubljana, the capital of the nation, as well as in 
Brussels, the capital of the European Union. It is, alas, far from new. A quick 
glance at Slovenian history reveals a long tradition of this erroneous, albeit po-
litically potent “numbers game.” To offer but one example, one can recall the 
th century Ilyrian tradition of literary writers like Stanko Vraz and Ljudevit 
Gaj, who called for the unification of the Slovenian and Croatian languages on 
the basis of alleged “linguistic pragmatism.” After the First World War, this argu-
ment, advanced by the central communist authorities of the federal state, mani-
fested itself in the ideological straight-jacket of “integral Yugoslavism” (Wachtel 
 et passim). Today, the argument is often promoted by those numerous and 
loud members of the political elite who do not understand politics in the an-
 spaces of identity /
cient Greek sense, that is, as a discussion of res publica, “public affairs.” Instead, 
they view it as nothing else but a sheer technology of power. As such, they mis-
takenly believe that Slovenians can somehow be European in a direct, unmedi-
ated, and “natural” sense, without first being who Slovenians really are: the citi-
zens of the Slovenian nation-state. In other words, the fact that Slovenians are 
Europeans only insofar as they are citizens of the Slovenian nation-state goes 
almost entirely lost among the folds of the “numbers game.”
I am convinced, though, that the issue should be reversed. It was precisely 
the numerical limitation of Slovenians as a people that forced the key players 
in the Slovenian national culture to interact with foreign strategies of creativity 
and thinking, critically recuperating them according to their own will and prin-
ciples. After all, the small population, coupled with a productive, if trouble-
some, geographic location at the crossroads of the Romanic, Hungarian, Ger-
manic and Balkan cultural traditions from which it draws its manifold constitu-
tive elements, has always presented our ancestors with the impossibility of an 
ideal of bucolic “sameness.” ͳe concept of self-absorbed and uncontaminated 
Slovenian culture where a national ego in Arcadia would be quietly nurtured is, 
of course, but an illusion.
Slovenian creative minds have traditionally been engaged in a dialogue with 
the gospel of Western civilization, drawing on the linguistic self-confidence of 
Protestantism, the Italian Renaissance, the Central European baroque, French 
rationalism, German Romanticism and Expressionism, historicist Viennese ar-
chitecture, English rock ’n’ roll, American pop-art and French nouvelle vague 
films, not to mention the allure of the Hollywood screen and the intricacies of 
Balkan folk blues.
ͳe idea that art and culture, if understood only as a formal ornament to 
public life, can provide neither national freedom nor unfettered flights of imag-
ination, appeared very early in Slovenian history. ͳe sheer decorative, non-
substantial character of works of art and the cultural tradition at large would, 
of course, end in nothing other than a gradual decay. ͳe leading Slovenian lit-
erary critic in the period between the world wars, Josip Vidmar, captured the 
importance of local interaction with the tendencies of the wider world in his 
seminal essay “ͳe Cultural Problems of Slovenian Identity” (). He vividly 
explained that a small nation is “like a very uneven peninsula – the ocean keeps 
splashing against its many shores and the fresh wind infinitely blows over its 
entire surface” (Vidmar ).
ͳis commitment to the “winds” of Central European sentiment and the 
“ocean” of the Western civilizing experience has personally helped me in two 
ways. Both as a literary artist using universal codes of expression to present 
what I believe is an individual vision, and as a Slovenian with a particular col-
lective experience in my background, I gradually came to see that it would be 
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impossible to divorce myself from the treasure of my national cultural refer-
ences, knowledge of which allowed me to appreciate and integrate the experi-
ence of other cultural traditions. A truly cosmopolitan personality can only be 
one, I surmise, who comfortably traverses the various cultural meridians of the 
planet without giving up the reflection of his/her national roots. Such genuine 
cosmopolitanism was, for example, exercised in the creative opuses and per-
sonal biographies of James Joyce, Pablo Picasso, Rainer Maria Rilke, Samuel 
Beckett and Paul Celan, whose works display a remarkable degree of multicul-
tural competence. ͳeir chosen language of expression was enhanced by nu-
ances and semantic possibilities precisely because it rested on a close proximity 
and cross-fertilization with other languages and cultural traditions.
Moreover, it can be argued that their respective civic identities were funda-
mentally arbitrary insofar as they were chosen by free subjects. Rational iden-
tity of citizenship as a matter of choice differs sharply from a “natural” ethnic 
identity to the extent that it is based on a republican respect for differences and 
active public expression rather than succumbing to the oft-invoked, though es-
sentially passive, camouflage of “tolerance.” Such cosmopolitanism links with-
out unifying. Politically speaking, it contributes to a transformation of “natural,” 
“inherited,” “genuine” identities into a civic identity based on a common body 
of laws that is freely accepted by free and therefore equal individuals. ͳis ac-
ceptance of rule of law can only be performed in modern nation-states (Raulet 
).
In post-independence Slovenia, there are two types of provincialism that 
combat this kind of civic and cosmopolitan habitus. ͳe first one was given 
birth to by the conservative nationalistic formula of an autarkic, rabidly exclu-
sivist and often violent “navel gazing,” i.e. the mentality that cannot, would not, 
and is unable to learn anything from others, much less accept “others” (those 
that are ethnically not Slovenian) into public life. ͳe second kind of provincial-
ism is represented by the bona fide liberal “internationalists” whose main char-
acteristic might be seen in the fact that they despise each and every aspect of 
the national cultural identity because they fear being lumped together with the 
exclusivist nationalist zealots. As a result, this position drives “internationalist” 
liberals toward an uncritical approval of each and every idea that comes from 
“the West.” Such minds offer a servile, ingratiating “bless you!” when this or that 
fashionable cultural guru sneezes in Paris, London or New York.
Both kinds of opponents to the admittedly uneasy glocal dialectics [see Da-
kovic in this volume] are active in contemporary Slovenia. ͳis constellation 
is, alas, not all that different from other post-communist countries. ͳe velvet 
revolutions in  indeed produced a semblance of the renaissance of the na-
tional ideas in Eastern and Central Europe, encouraging debates on the validity 
of the national cultural experience and teasing people with the cheap utopian 
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promise of miraculously resolved conflicts in newly independent countries. Al-
most a decade after the annus mirabilis, however, it has become rather clear 
that only a very few original approaches to the relation between the national 
and global aspect of collective identity emerged from the ruins of the commu-
nist ancien regime. Intellectuals from Central and Eastern Europe have, with the 
largely thoughtless transplantation of assorted Western stereotypes and con-
ceptual forms, almost unanimously accepted the role of “poor relatives” that 
only compete with each other in efforts to impress their rich cousins in Europe, 
that is, Western Europe.
However, what kind of Europe are we really talking about? I, for one, remain 
convinced that the discussion must primarily concentrate on the following dif-
ference between two aspects of “the European idea.” On the one hand, one must 
entertain the project of integrating the diverse European societies, an enterprise 
based exclusively on economic and technological standards. As such, this is a 
goal that is as interesting as it is crucial. On the other hand, one must take mea-
sure of Europe as a common, if elusive spiritual and mental realm. What is the 
price of the first aspect taking over the second? Modern European epiphany 
does not reveal itself solely in the noble tradition of Roman law, Greek phi-
losophy, Renaissance art and Romantic poetry, and of the politically crucial En-
lightenment legacy of universal human and civil rights. ͳe contemporary idea 
of Europe is also increasingly being advanced in popular right-wing politics 
of “fascism with a smile” and “fortress Europe.” ͳis highly conservative gate-
keeping is cast as a tool to bolster what is perceived as a “natural” ethnic com-
munity to which one must either be born or one does not belong. Tertium non 
datur.
No less relevant is the fact that, after the dismantling of the Berlin Wall and 
after German reunification, Western Europe cannot, despite the ever-growing 
homogenization of global markets and rising levels of economic integration 
within EU-member states, obscure its moral failure and political sterility. In-
deed, the internal disintegration of its political and moral backbone was in a 
particularly excruciating way laid bare in the third Balkan war in -, 
where European diplomacy for the most part struggled to deny the basic right 
of self-defense to Bosnian and Croatian victims. ͳis situation is painfully remi-
niscent of the s, a period in which Europe was blindly proud of its arrogant 
authority of “the sick… secret diplomacy that trades with territories of small na-
tions, calming down the rebellious looks with the League of Nations, run by the 
traders and oppressors themselves,” as the Slovenian avant-garde poet Srečko 
Kosovel wrote in  in his lucid public lecture “Disintegration of Society and 
Decay of Art” (Kosovel ). Kosovel was, needless to say, describing the situ-
ation in his own time. His prophetic insight, however, poetically intimates the 
situation today.
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More to the point: thrilled by the political proximity to Western Europe and 
full of resentment at the present Serbian political madness of national socialism, 
those who shape the Slovenian public discourse all too often grow oblivious to 
the fact that, in the contemporary world, the philosophy of postmodern domi-
nation no longer requires machine guns to express itself. ͳe primary strategy 
today appears to be the use of forms of the seemingly harmless “ethnically neu-
tral” economy, transnational capital, uniform cultural patterns and a gradual 
mass media unification of each and every particular mentality and idiosyncratic 
experience. 
If Slovenia is to survive as a full-fledged civic and modern secular nation-
state in these times of unavoidable economic integration and vapid rhetoric 
about a “united Europe,” then one must keep in mind not only the capacities of 
economic productivity, but also those of national operas and theaters. Success-
ful businessmen should thrive equally well supporting a variety of national and 
regional TV and radio stations; political know-how should be thought about in 
the same breath as the accomplishments of the diverse creative and intellectual 
impulses in the country. While it is certainly not easy for such impulses to ex-
tend their reach beyond national borders, the importance of cultural creativity 
nonetheless lies in serving as a constant reminder that, after the declaration of 
independence in , the Slovenian dilemma was no longer spontaneously ex-
pressed in terms of the defeatist traditional formula, advanced by the th cen-
tury local writer, Fran Levstik: “We can either be Russian or Prussian.” Today, 
Slovenians can finally be themselves.
Having said all that, I make no bones about the claim. I do realize that 
there is no point in pretending to ignore relevant historical and socio-political 
processes that have led to the contemporary condition. In other words, from 
the village champions (Yugoslavia), Slovenians have become the Olympic los-
ers (Western Europe). Instead of colonization with the accompanying politics 
of Italifying, Germanicizing and Serbifying under the guise of an integral “Yu-
goslavism,” all of which were fought against not in the least because the enemy 
was possible to define, we are now facing anonymous multinational capital. Its 
formidable forces are discussed by Slavoj Zizek in “Multiculturalism Or ͳe 
Cultural Logic Of Multinational Capitalism” (Zizek -). Here, this inter-
nationally recognized philosopher bitterly argues that multinational capital no 
longer calls for the use of unmediated violence, since particular cultures are 
much more effectively destroyed by the global market itself.
How to respond to this challenge? I have no original answer. As a poet, 
though, I simply think that inspiration may still be drawn from the rich heritage 
of Slovenian cultural innovation and experiment, if not directly from literary 
works of art. Cold comfort, I admit. It is, alas, most likely the only comfort we 
have. A political program that would ignore the manifold cultural components 
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of national identity in Slovenian efforts to join the European Union would soon 
find itself in a position where it would be reduced to managing a perhaps bet-
ter paid, yet sorrowfully hollowed-out labor force, whose main attraction for 
foreign investors would be its comparatively low hourly wage.
A responsible attitude towards the national tradition is essential to the ex-
tent that culture is not a gift from our ancestors. Instead, Slovenians have bor-
rowed it from their own grandchildren, if such a sentimental claim is permissi-
ble. Today’s situation is less than promising. In Central and Eastern Europe, one 
is dealing with ethnic fundamentalism which prioritizes the ideology of Blut-
und-Boden, on the one hand, and an upsurge of a-national liberalism, inadver-
tently embedded in the social-Darwinist logic of the market on the other.
Benjamin Barber described in his meticulously researched Jihad vs. Mc-
World these intertwined processes as a mixture of hatred and privileging of the 
tribal form, on the one hand, and the all-embracing maximization of profit on 
the other. Specific movements founded on the basis of ethnic, religious or cul-
tural obsessions with a prescribed and, as a rule, exclusivist way of communica-
tion, which Barber ominously calls Jihad, as well as McWorld movements (as-
pirations for uniformity and homogenization promoted by global corporations 
and, more often than not, trans-national bodies such as the IMF and World 
Bank), share many similarities despite their mutual hostility. ͳe underlying 
idea of both is a dismissal of democracy. Jihad uses the bloody policy of ethnic 
exclusivism, while McWorld prefers the bloodless economy of profit. ͳe re-
sult of the former is voluntary blindness which persecutes traitors of the tribal 
“cause,” while the latter induces a consumerist rigor mortis where we all do 
nothing but “entertain ourselves to death.”
Under neither the Jihad’s canopy nor the McWorld umbrella, however, is 
there place for a citizen. ͳis is Barber’s theoretically most fruitful insight. 
While Jihad replaces the citizen by a paranoid warrior, McWorld cheerfully cul-
tivates an ignorant consumer. If the ancient Greek truth si non est civis, non est 
homo is today as valid as it should be, then accepting either Jihad or McWorld 
will mean a premeditated catastrophe. Without the comprehensive experience 
of citizenship, there is no democracy. 
ͳe emphasis on democracy within this context is essential if one is to real-
ize that the democratic order provides conditions for the emergence of a public 
sphere with its capability to produce conditions for emergence and sustenance 
of various personal practices and freely chosen cultural styles as well as mul-
tiple identities. In this regard, it is crucial to improve the existing institutions 
of the political state and, if necessary, develop new mechanisms that foster and 
nurture the possibilities of the kind of personal identification which allows one 
to choose one’s identities, thus enjoying “constitutional patriotism” regardless 
of ethnic origins, race, and tradition. Insofar as civic identification with the in-
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stitutions of the political state based on the rule of law and equal participation 
in public life is the only buffer against the insipid forces of ethnic nationalism 
which exclude different (other, minority, foreign) forms of cultural expressions 
on the one hand, and against the hollow idea of world-citizens wherein it re-
mains profoundly unclear as to which democratically elected bodies, if any, ac-
tually do represent citizens and make them act in accordance with their rights 
and responsibilities on the other, the defense of the civic nation-state appears to 
be of utmost importance. In other words, civic responsibilities, cultural and po-
litical rights, both collective and individual, and articulations of one’s personal 
preferences should be defended in a democratic state. In this respect, ethnic 
identity is but one of the elements for citizen identity, which is based on the 
separation of national (in terms of a state) and ethnic (in terms of received cul-
tural background) markers. Such a modern state arises from the development 
of a secular, universalist and democratic polity in which citizens as equals be-
fore the law may enjoy the right, though not necessarily the obligation, to orga-
nize their life according to their preferred cultural, religious and political stocks 
of meaning. 
ͳis is only possible under the condition that the public sphere is not sub-
sumed either under the mantle of state institutions, thus siphoning off the cre-
ative and critical potential of a variety of impulses, programs, and lifestyles that 
are articulated outside of governmental bodies, nor left to the mercy of eco-
nomically reductivist and often aggressive corporate interventions into the in-
dividual and collective life-world.
Such a public sphere depends on the existence of civil society which, in turn, 
forms itself through the tension vis-à-vis the political institutions of the nation-
state. ͳis tension is a corner stone of a modern democratic society. From this 
vantage point, the importance of the civic nation-state is unavoidable since it 
provides the minimum regulation of conditions for the functioning of the mul-
tifaceted social life. Zygmunt Bauman, possibly the most lucid theorist of post-
modernity in the English-speaking world, in his  book Life in Fragments 
argues: “ͳe greater… the share of nation-state sovereignty ceded to the all-
European agencies, the smaller… the chance that the nation-state-based identi-
ties will be successfully defended” (). Should one choose to dismiss the idea 
of the democratic nation-state, one, thus, in the final analysis, ushers in the 
proliferation of local and ethnic communities, and concomitantly tolerates the 
destructive crusade of “fast music, fast food and fast computers” of the global 
capitalist machine.
Allowing both processes to grow unhindered would in my opinion prove 
disastrous. ͳe worlds of Jihad and McWorld are by definition incapable of 
respecting that unity of symbolic, cultural and social experience that builds a 
multifaceted history of national existence and the collective mentalities that in-
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form it. Both are primarily reflected in the mother’s tongue. ͳe latter is not 
only a mechanical tool of communication. Instead, it must be first and foremost 
understood as a peculiar worldview. For this writer, a poet by vocation, this as-
pect is of fundamental relevance in discussing affairs of culture, its pitfalls and 
advantages.
ͳe fateful intimacy of language and national identity was in Slovenian 
history best perceived by poets, starting with a founding father of modern let-
ters, Romantic poet France Prešeren. His rejection of German, the language 
he brought to the highest aesthetic levels, did not imply a simple pragmatic 
exchange of the means of expression (a financially more powerful area, larger 
public, bigger market, etc.). Prešeren’s commitment to his mother tongue was 
an embodiment of an existential and political decision, serving as his article of 
faith that seems to be today gaining a renewed importance. If mother tongue 
presents a particular worldview, it is possible to argue that it also represents a 
specific comprehensive perspective that cannot be sufficiently expressed in any 
other language (Debeljak).
Consider the following anecdote. After a lecture, one of my students once 
came up to me and ruefully stated that he was really not sure what made him 
a Slovenian. He surfs the Internet, watches MTV and Hollywood “slash and 
burn” movies, shops at Benetton, and listens to the regretfully now defunct Vi-
ennese international radio station, Blue Danube Radio, while the rural idyll of 
Slovenian “hayracks” and the rituals of peasant festivities are, understandably 
and legitimately, lost to him. I am sure that he is not alone in facing this central 
dilemma. I often wonder about it myself. But when, in the course of our discus-
sion, I switched to English only to prove a point, my student suddenly realized 
how English, despite being the lingua franca of the modern world and the lan-
guage of international mass culture, radically narrowed his verbal register and 
flattened out his imaginative horizon.
It is thus the specific perspective of the mother tongue that integrates many 
of the cultural, geographic, symbolic and social aspects of national experience. 
ͳe refuge of our mother tongue is thus the place where every single thing has 
a name. No wonder. Language, after all, transcends our individuality since it 
is older and greater than time which is, in turn, older and greater than space, 
as Joseph Brodsky illuminatingly says in his  essay “To Please A Shadow.” 
Make no mistake: I, too, find the nationalistic logic which ignores all that is 
foreign and different most repulsive. But that does not mean that I have to au-
tomatically subscribe to another extreme which would make me reject the na-
tional cultural experience tout court. 
Another personal example might better illustrate this point. I happened to 
have spent many years in the United States. I have my second alma mater there, 
my publisher, my friends, my editorial affiliations and professional network. In-
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deed, it would perhaps not be too presumptuous to claim that I figuratively live 
on a bridge between Slovenia and America. In my home in Ljubljana, my wife 
and I speak American English to each other for she, herself an American, does 
not yet feel comfortable in her adopted language.
Despite varieties of such “Americanization” of my self, however, I cannot 
and would not follow the many Slovenian politicians who support economic 
reductionism and their business counterparts, who blissfully declare that a dis-
respect of the mother tongue, five hundred words in Basic English and fluency 
in the rhetoric of cable TV spontaneously puts them on the best path to the 
promised land of (Western) Europe. I have no desire whatsoever to adopt this 
formulaic attitude. I cannot support it because I know that a human being can-
not live on bread alone. However, this does not necessarily mean that I support 
the privileges of starvation, either.
If it is true that life without a spiritual sphere in which the existential experi-
ence of an individual and of a collective as an “imagined community” (Benedict 
Anderson) can be fully expressed is but a dull vegetative life, then the economic 
success of Slovenia in the age of its newly gained independence must be ac-
companied by a cultural narrative about the symbolic and the material value 
of language, ethical values, the fateful burden of history and the mythic tradi-
tion. ͳis story makes us see our lives against the broader background of the 
national condition, making us a critical link in the great chain of being that is 
not going to end with us; it will help us preserve our national culture and lan-
guage in the current era of European integration that, openly or not, considers 
smaller nations an unnecessary inconvenience. 
Many sceptics would, of course, contest the need to preserve national cul-
ture. ͳese voices argue that the concern with res publica should be exclusively 
a matter for professional politicians. I cannot but think otherwise. I am con-
vinced that the preservation of the cultural conscience in a broader environ-
ment of a civil society is essential in a democratic nation-state not only because 
it is too important to be left to the political elite alone. Now that Slovenians 
have come to the end of the Yugoslav via dolorosa, understanding the impor-
tance of national culture and the many different traditions from which it draws, 
as emphasized earlier, may prevent the citizens of the Slovenian nation-state 
from turning into “Viennese lackeys,” as the Serbian popular press is wont to 
call Slovenians. ͳis crass metaphor is, of course, farfetched but it nonetheless 
forcefully dramatizes the present Slovenian uncritical longing towards the “Eu-
ropean Paradise Lost.”
If one attempts to resist the current temptation summed up by the per-
verted Cartesian slogan “I shop therefore I am,” then one may still find inspira-
tion – with doubts though not without hope, in a dedicated, though not glorify-
ing way – in the constantly changing and publicly negotiated meaning of the 
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cultural tradition. ͳrough these very negotiations and struggles to maintain 
the multi-layered makeup of the cultural frame, one may perhaps figure out 
where one stands while attempting to decode the signals of the modern pre-
catastrophic world in which not only individuals but entire nations are being 
destroyed. Under the pressure of the ideology of “cold peace,” entire nations are 
condemned to disappearance, as we have been all too painfully reminded by the 
Bosnian tragedy. 
To assume a firm stand against both the provincial mindset of ethnic exclu-
sivism as well as that of corporate homogenization, one is invited to look back 
to the history of Slovenian literature. ͳere, at least to me, the grace of that 
special light is revealed, in the glow of which our lives are enriched by that nar-
rative which is “just to the complexity and multiple meanings of history and is 
able to open up a broad realm of human creativity that with the elegance of its 
form reaches a kind of transcendence and appeals to the better aspects of our 
selves,” as the American critic Neil Postman put it in his opening speech at the 
Frankfurt Book Fair in .
ͳe inspiration that Slovenes use to measure their distance and proximity to 
the collective mentality is probably best seen in the characters of literary works 
of art. ͳeir destinies and struggles are still, in my biased opinion as a literary 
artist, a great source of inspiration even today. ͳese struggles best reveal how 
the existential dilemma of Slovenians has always been connected with the di-
lemma of cultural identity. ͳe latter has not been automatically accepted as a 
given, as it was not accepted either by Germans or by Serbs. In other words, 
Slovenians have been living under the same roof in a less than equal relation-
ship with the former for eleven long centuries and with the latter for seventy 
years.
ͳe characters in Slovenian literature had to fight first for their identity, and 
second, to ensure wider public recognition. ͳe essential archetype of these 
rites of passage suggests their contemporary usage. Slovenians have not created 
a nation-state only to freely enjoy the thrills of ex Occidente luxus. ͳe nation-
state should be here to help us be, and not to simply have, to paraphrase Erich 
Fromm’s perhaps forgotten, though, I submit, still very powerful distinction.
ͳe emphasis that I have chosen to place on language and comprehensive, 
that is, multi-layered and never-fixed national cultural experience has, in the 
limited context of this essay, but a single ambition: to dramatize the dangers in-
herent in an entirely economic approach to Slovenian identity. ͳat is, the ap-
proach which strives to put each and every affair of culture, art and their social 
existence at the mercy of the invisible hand of the market. If one is not aware of 
the history of one’s national culture, which cannot and should not be measured 
according to its “marketability” alone, one may very well turn into a member 
of the tribe of children with no memory and no concerns and thus, by exten-
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sion, no freedom. H. G. Wells describes the consequences of losing one’s sense 
of history in his work ͷe Time Machine, where such a tribe found itself totally 
unprotected when it faced cannibalistic children from the dark side.
A small nation at the end of the th century is thus presented both with a 
challenge and a responsibility to show that its citizens are able to turn freedom 
from an abstract, if noble concept into a meaningful, if messy, social experi-
ence. 
N O T E S
*         A modified version of this paper was presented at the seminar “On Divided Societies: 
Concepts and Institutions in Comparative Perspective” at the Interuniversity Center, 
Dubrovnik, in April .
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